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Summary:
n  Attempts to resolve the problems in Europe are failing, 
and  the  crisis  is  spreading  from  Greece,  Ireland,  and 
Portugal to larger nations. 
n  Europe’s financial system relies on moral hazard, i.e., a “no 
defaults” policy, to attract the funding needed to roll over 
large amounts of short–term bank and sovereign debt. 
Now that politicians in creditor nations are calling for 
private sector burden sharing, investors are demanding 
higher interest rates to hold these debts. But higher rates 
may tip banks and nations toward bankruptcy.
n  Europe’s banks and financial system are highly integrated 
across countries. Rising expectations of default in some 
countries could lead to large-scale capital flight into “safe” 
countries. This shift will raise concerns regarding solvency 
and liquidity of many financial institutions.
n  The payments system of the euro area is serving as an 
opaque bailout mechanism that is currently preventing 
the euro area from falling apart at this time. If the number 
of nations in trouble spreads beyond Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal, this bailout system will be stressed because of 
the potential size of accumulated funding.
n  The European Central Bank (ECB) could soon see a vocal 
debate between inflationist and hawkish (anti–inflation) 
members. Inflationists will call for large–scale interven-
tions,  including  bond  buybacks  and  emergency  loans, 
while the hawks will attempt to close loopholes in the 
payments  system  that  effectively  permit  each  troubled 
nation to create money needed to finance capital flight 
and budget deficits.
n  At  this  stage  in  the  debate,  we  see  little  chance  that 
Europe can avoid ending the “moral hazard” regime, in 
which case it needs to plan for widespread sovereign and 
bank debt restructurings. 
We see three plausible scenarios in the coming months:
1.  The euro area manages to regain credibility regarding its 
willingness to “do whatever it takes” to resolve the current 
crisis while avoiding defaults and inflation. This ironically 
requires far more rapid and larger austerity than currently 
planned in the periphery. 
2.  The euro area choses decisively to end the moral hazard 
regime. While this will not be orderly, the problems can 
be reduced through comprehensive and rapid actions to 
restructure sovereign and bank debt in highly indebted 
nations, while recapitalizing banks elsewhere. 
3.  The euro area remains in limbo, unable to choose a clear 
path. This would lead to a large disorderly series of finan-
cial sector and sovereign defaults, while an “inflationary 
majority” is likely to eventually assert control of the ECB 
and manage a massive liquidity expansion. 
The  euro  crisis  is  not  under  control.  Deep  structural 
flaws have become apparent—particularly the extent to which 
moral hazard has underpinned credit flows within the euro 
area. Ending this moral hazard will not be easy, particularly as 
European decision–making structures are struggling to find a 
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The euro area iS failing To geT The 
criSiS under conTrol
Figure  1  shows  the  price  of  five–year  credit  default  swaps 
(CDS)  offering  protection  against  default  across  euro  area 
sovereigns. It is clear that CDS prices in the periphery nations 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) are trending up 
and  most  are  near  or  at  all–time  highs,  despite  successive 
bailout programs and repeated commitments from politicians 
that no defaults would occur. Market prices currently imply 
an 88 percent chance of default in Greece within five years. 
More worrying is the rise of Italian CDS prices to near–record 
levels on July 11. These now imply a 25 percent chance Italy 
will  default  within  the  next  five  years.  (These  calculations 
assume a 40 percent recovery rate post–default.)
euro area STrucTural flawS explain 
The dangerouS debT burdenS ThaT 
could Topple The euro area
Key rules regarding money creation in the euro area explain the 
current dangerous situation. Since its founding, the European 
Central Bank has used repurchase operations as a major tool 
of monetary policy. In practice, this means that the 7,856 
banks (monetary financial institutions at the end of 2010) 
in the euro area are able to buy sovereign debt of any euro 
area member nation and then present these to national central 
banks, which act on behalf of the ECB, as collateral for new 
finance. The ECB set collateral rules that made short–term 
paper more attractive than long–term paper (Buiter and Sibert 
2005, 7-14). Initially the Bank also treated all nations equally, 
regardless of credit ratings. Later it adjusted collateral require-
ments for nations to reflect their credit ratings, although these 
adjustments were minor.
As a result of this system, it became very profitable for 
banks to buy short–term government paper and deposit that 
paper with the ECB in return for loans. The margin between 
the returns on the government paper and ECB lending rates 
became profit for the commercial banks. 
This  system  generated  three  major  developments  that 
have contributed to the build–up of risk. First, the ECB repo 
system made government bonds highly liquid, because a buyer 
could always turn to the Bank for funds. This increased market 
access for smaller European nations that would otherwise have 
had difficulty issuing a great deal of debt. Second, while the 
ECB did not promote this explicitly, investors grew confident, 
with good reason, that the Bank and the European Union 
would never let a sovereign fail. There were good reasons to 
believe this. All major European banks built up substantial 
portfolios  of  short–term  sovereign  debt  and  sovereigns,  in 
turn, issued more of this debt. It became very clear that sover-
eign defaults could be catastrophic for the banking system, 
and so would be very unlikely to occur. 
Finally, the system became even more dangerous as many 
banks went on a credit expansion spree. European banks issued 
short–term bonds in order to finance additional long–term 
loans. This was possible because the balance sheets of banks 
were filled with assets that could be used as collateral at the 
ECB. Investors concluded that banks would not have liquidity 
problems given their ECB access, and they assumed that if 
solvency issues arose, governments or shareholders would be 
prepared to inject capital to prevent defaults. The regulatory 
environment in Europe, which did not include leverage limits 
similar to those in the United States, also encouraged European 
banks to use leverage to buy relatively “safe” securities rather 
than take on what were perceived as less risky assets. Thus 
European  banks  became  major  financiers  of  America’s  real 
estate debts, which were perceived to be safe until 2007–08.  
moving from a moral hazard regime To 
“fend for yourSelf”
A typical corporation tends to have relatively little debt, and it 
chooses maturities for its debts such that it has plenty of time 
to repay them with cash flow or to raise new funds should 
brief periods of difficult market access arise. This is not the 
case with sovereigns and banks. 
Sovereigns  tend  to  build  up  much  larger  short–term 
debt than they can repay with immediate cash flow as they 
have access to regular tax revenues, making them more secure 
borrowers. They also have the backing of a central bank that 
can ultimately print new money or buy bonds if needed to 
cover government treasury cash flow needs. Because banks are 
regulated, and their deposits are typically largely guaranteed 
by governments (in places like the European Union), investors 
naturally expect governments will bail out banks if short–term 
liquidity is needed.
The problem the euro area faces is that creditors lent money 
to banks and the sovereign under the assumption that they 
would all be supported fully during periods of trouble. Led by 
Germany, the euro area is now switching from a “moral hazard” 
Key rules regarding money creation 
in the euro area explain the 
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regime  to  new  arrangements  under  which  all  nations  must 
fend for themselves. The stated reason is that these nations will 
otherwise spend too much and become insolvent. Furthermore, 
the Germans would like to see creditors bear the risk of default 
rather than taxpayers in creditor nations (like Germany). 
While the German logic is impeccable and could lead 
to a much more financially sound euro area, there is no easy 
roadmap to follow from Europe’s current debt structure to 
the one consistent with German-inspired austerity. Had these 
German principles been in place from 1997, most nations in 
the euro area would necessarily have far less debt, their debt 
would be longer maturity, and their banks would be less lever-
aged. In the meantime, presumably, we may already have had 
multiple mini–financial crises in which sovereigns or banks or 
both failed due to “buyers’ strikes” regarding their securities. 
It becomes increasingly likely that no lender of last resort 
exists in the euro area, making it more like a typical emerging 
market than a developed nation. Emerging markets succumb 
to  defaults  because  they  borrow  in  currencies  which  they 
cannot print. The defaults occur when the nation runs out of 
foreign currency with which to make payments on its debt. 
Such nations typically have low debt levels relative to income 
and modest short–term debt, compared with the 85 percent 
debt/gross domestic product average in the euro area. If the 
Germans get their way, we should compare euro area deficits 
and debt levels to emerging markets, not to other developed 
nations with their own printing presses and domestic debt. 
There is no doubt that the ECB understands the dangerous 
dilemma it helped create. Jean-Claude Trichet, the Bank’s pres-
ident, says the Euro area financial stability warning monitor 
should be labelled “code red,” and he has called repeatedly for 
“no defaults, no credit events, no selective default” in the euro 
area. Presumably, he has concluded that there are potentially 
dire implications when investors conclude the moral hazard 



































































































































































































































































































































































































1 2/1/2011 2/1/2006 2/1/2007 2/1/2008 2/1/2009 2/1/2010

























GermanyN u m b e r   Pb11 - 1 3   J u l y   2 0 1 1
4
regime in the euro area is coming to an abrupt end. In addi-
tion, Trichet commented: “The most serious threat to finan-
cial stability in the European Union stems from the interplay 
between the vulnerabilities of public finances in certain EU 
member states and the banking system, with potential conta-
gion effects across the Union and beyond.”)1
are any naTionS in The euro area 
SolvenT? maybe noT—ThaT iS why The 
abrupT end of moral hazard iS So 
dangerouS
Government  solvency  is  a  long–term  accounting  concept. 
There is no magic formula that can determine, even roughly, 
which nation is solvent today and which is not.2 Because very 
long–term growth rates, interest rates and budget balances must 
be predicted in order to determine whether a nation is solvent, 
there is a large degree of arbitrariness when pronouncing one 
nation solvent and another insolvent. Economists are very bad 
at predicting long–term growth rates, and the interest rate on 
debt paid at any point in time invariably reflects sentiment, 
current liquidity conditions, and many other factors. While 
common “wisdom” is that Greece is surely insolvent today, it is 
very easy, as the International Monetary Fund does from time 
to time, to create plausible scenarios in which Greece is solvent.
The ability to refinance or roll over debt is a much clearer 
concept, and it is this need for liquidity that breaks nations 
and pushes them into default. Figure 2 shows rough estimates 
of the financing needs for some euro area countries over the 
next year to cover debt falling due plus the budget deficit. 
There is wide variance in amounts due, ranging from 7 percent 
of GDP for Austria to one–third of GDP for Greece. Because 
all these nations are running budget deficits, none of them can 
source this financing from their revenues.  
European banks also require large short–term funding. 
According  to  the  recently  published  European  Banking 
Authority stress test results, the 90 banks covered in that test 
owe €4.772 trillion within 24 months, equaling 38 percent of 
European Union GDP and 51% of euro area GDP (European 
Banking Authority 2011, 17). In France, Italy, and Germany, 
the largest two banks alone need to roll over 6 percent, 9 
percent and 17 percent of national GDP in debt, respectively, 
1. http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9O128T80.htm. 
2. A general rule of thumb is that, for fiscal sustainability, a country needs to 
run a primary budget surplus (i.e., the budget balance, measured as a percent-
age of GDP, excluding interest payments), equal to the nominal interest rate 
minus its nominal growth rate, multiplied by its government debt/GDP ratio. 
By this simple rule Greece is solvent so long as it eventually manages to grow 
faster than the interest rate on its debt—and if it eventually achieves a primary 
balance. Such conditions seem difficult now, but they are not unimaginable.
within 24 months. This compares to just 1.6 percent of GDP 
for the largest two banks in the United States.3 Since the ability 
to raise such large amounts of short–term finance in Europe 
rests on market confidence that the ECB and banks’ respec-
tive sovereigns are standing by as a lender of last resort, any 
rapid shift toward a regime where bailouts are unlikely could 
quickly lead to a liquidity crisis for some marginal banks.   
One  year  into  a  five–year  IMF–backed  program  in 
Greece, it is becoming clear that many people in the European 
Union and in Greece itself would like to require creditors to 
absorb some losses on the country’s sovereign bonds. If this 
occurs,  markets  will  naturally  conclude  that  Ireland  and 
Portugal will also default in some fashion, as there is little 
appetite for expanded bailouts and—under their current IMF 
programs—each of these countries will need market access to 
roll over debt within a year or two. Further, if sovereign bonds 
can be restructured, why would authorities continue to use 
taxpayer funds to back senior debt of banks? There is no doubt 
that Greece’s large banks have avoided insolvency only at the 
behest of the government and the ECB.
Investors must then decide what interest rate they need 
on Italian debt, where the debt/GDP ratio is 120 percent, in 
order to bear the risk of default. If we assume a 25 percent 
risk of a 40 percent loss over five years, then Italian CDS 
would need to trade at 325 basis points. However, at 325 basis 
points, or roughly a 5 percent yield on five–year bonds, to 
maintain a stable debt/GDP ratio, Italy would need approxi-
mately a 2.5 percent GDP fiscal improvement (i.e., increase 
in primary surplus). Can the country achieve this quickly in 
the midst of rising interest rates and credit tightening? If not, 
the debt/GDP ratio will continue to rise and markets may 
be further concerned about defaults or restructuring. Since 
Italian  commercial  banks  own  approximately  one–third  of 
Italy’s debt burden, their solvency too must be questioned.
This argument for Italy can be repeated for more nations. 
How safe is Spain given the lack of clarity regarding the fiscal 
solvency of its banking sector and growth prospects? How safe 
is Belgium given its high debt levels and weak political system? 
The French debt burden is substantial, and France is arguably 
slow to gets its deficit under control, so what premium should 
France pay? 
If several sovereigns are in default then the problems for 
remaining nations only grow. What will the fiscal bailouts 
3. These data for two–year rollovers cover bonds and loans from July 2011 
to July 2013 reported by Bloomberg. The small figures for the United States 
reflect the much lower dependence on wholesale finance in the United 
States, although a more fragmented banking sector also explains part of the 
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of  banks,  insurance  and  pension  funds  amount  to  in  this 
scenario? And will this in turn raise risks for sovereign debt?4 
In its analysis of the recent stress test data, Goldman Sachs 
reports that the exposure at default of the European Bank System 
to the GIIPS sovereigns (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain) equals 1.5 times their tangible equity.  This dangerous 
interconnectedness means a systemic financial collapse is quite 
possible if Europe does not soon regain control of its problems 
(Goldman Sachs 2011, 1). 
Given the large uncertainties and risks, European govern-
ment bonds do not look attractive. At best they return par 
plus  interest;  at  worst  you  may  find  national  governments 
in Europe change domestic law to make your bonds nearly 
worthless. Unlike most emerging market bonds, which are 
4. The vast majority of sovereign bonds held by banks and insurance com-
panies are marked on the books at purchase price rather than current market 
value. If the European Union embarks on programs to restructure these bonds, 
the potential capital losses for the EU financial system are very large. 
typically under New York or British law, bonds of European 
nations are largely under domestic law. This makes it simple 
for any nation to restructure its debt, but also increases the fear 
of bond holders—once they understand their legal recourse in 
event of the default is minimal. 
STopping capiTal flighT would end The 
euro area
As each successive nation has run into crisis in Europe, the 
troubled nations suffer capital flight and a shortage of fiscal 
financing. Many commentators focus on the fiscal side, but 
that is only a small part of the total financing needed. The 
direct EU/IMF assistance disbursed so far been modest.5  
5. Through early July 2011, the IMF had disbursed about €17.3 billion to 
Greece (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11273.htm). 
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Figure 2     Principal to be paid from July 2011 to July 2012 (light) plus budget deficits (dark) for euro area     
  members as a percentage of 2011 estimated GDP
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The much larger financing needs come from capital flight. 
In Ireland the two leading banks lost €65 billion in deposits 
from the end of 2008 to the end of 2010—equal to 52 percent 
of Irish gross national product. Similar deposit losses have 
occurred in Greece. As bond yields rise, the local banks tend to 
buy, because their futures are inextricably tied to the survival 
of their sovereign. Foreign institutions tend to sell bonds back 
to the local banks of the government that issued them. Finally, 
corporations and households tend to save outside their local 
banks, and foreign bank branches tend to reduce the size of 
their balance sheets in troubled nations. 
All these transactions generate capital outflows. In a stand-
alone country, these large capital flows (in a fixed exchange 
rate regime like the euro) would deplete foreign reserves and 
normally lead to bank failures and government default due to 
lack of liquidity. However, the ECB has been instrumental in 
preventing this in the euro area. This “back door” financing 
comes  through  the  correspondent  accounts  of  national 
central banks in the euro area. The ECB operates a payment 
system that nets out transactions across borders. When, for 
example, there is more money flowing out of Irish banks into 
German banks, the Irish central bank incurs a liability to the 
Bundesbank.  The  Bundesbank  claims  on  Ireland  could  be 
repaid by the Central Bank of Ireland, for example by selling 
holdings of gold or other valuable assets, but this is not done. 
Instead, the balances continuously build up and they become 
financing to the Irish banking system.
Figure 3 shows the current status of this financing at the 
end of 2010. It illustrates that the Bundesbank is the largest 
creditor to the system, being owed €340 billion, while the 
central banks of  GIIPS are the largest debtors.  The total credit 
to GIIPS is €336 billion, which is more than the combined 
value of all the bailout packages to Greece plus the European 
Financial Stability Facility, the rescue fund backed by euro area 
nations. The credits are provided with no approval required 
from national parliaments or budgets, and there is an implicit 
assumption that all will be fully repaid.
These correspondent account balances are critical to the 
functioning of the euro system. If some central banks decided 
they  would  no  longer  accept  claims  from  another  central 
bank—let us say, hypothetically, the Bank of Ireland—this 
would effectively end the euro area. If euros held in Irish banks 
become less useful than euros held in German banks, the price 
of the two will diverge. 
This potential break–up of the euro area is exactly what 
happened in the ruble zone when the Soviet Union broke 
apart. In the former Soviet Union, each republic had a regional 
central bank. These banks handled the payments system for 
the region. Similar to the euro area, they could create money 
by crediting the deposit accounts of local bank branches and 
they could import cash. Once the USSR broke apart, many 
central banks raced to print money to benefit local interest 
groups. The resulting credit expansion generated very high 
inflation. The frenzy of money creation was stopped once the 
new national central banks refused to accept transfers of rubles 
from each other. Once central banks stopped accepting each 
other’s transactions, the value of the ruble evolved differently 
in each nation. Cash maintains a common value, but prices of 
deposits in the different banking systems can vary. 
In theory there is no limit to this euro area bailout mecha-
nism. Even governments can use it. They can sell bonds to 
their local banks, which then deposit those as collateral with 
the ECB in order to gain the funds needed to pay for the 
bonds. Correspondent account balances only pay the ECB 
discount rate as interest, so this is a cheap form of financing. 
In practice the ECB has tried to use moral suasion to stop 
abuse of these accounts. The ECB pressured Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal each to seek bilateral rescue loans and European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) funds rather than use their 
banks and ECB credits to finance their deficits and rollovers. 
If the euro area does move to end the “moral hazard” 
regime, we can expect much larger–scale capital flight from 
GIIPS and others. This will further increase the claims of the 
Bundesbank on GIIPS. While in theory these claims are liabil-
ities of the euro system as a whole, not just the Bundesbank, 
German taxpayers are still taking large risk through providing 
such credits. According to ECB statutes, if a national central 
bank defaults, the remaining central banks are required to 
recapitalize the euro system according to their shares in the 
capital  structure;  Germany’s  share  is  27  percent.  However, 
if we have multiple defaults across GIIPS and those nations 
did not contribute to recapitalize the euro system, Germany’s 
share would rise further. 
Realistic politicians may argue that these credits must stop 
growing. They could, for example, demand that the correspon-
dent account balances be reconciled each day, perhaps with 
shipments of gold or other valuable securities that cannot be 
created by national central banks. If such changes were made, 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal could not afford to settle their 
balance, and they are unlikely to be able to keep managing 
their payments systems which will remain in deficit into the 
future. Eventually, they would default on transactions. 
This potential break-up of the euro area 
is exactly what happened in the ruble 
zone when the Soviet Union broke apart.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 3   Ju l y   2 0 1 1
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Capital flight would anticipate this default and flee, as 
people rushed to transfer their savings to Germany, which 
would see a significant increase in liquidity, and its surpluses 
on the payments system would rise rapidly, while the nations 
in trouble would experience a large squeeze. It is the Germans, 
not the weak nations, who would want to end this payments 
system.  A plausible conclusion would be the exit of Germany 
from the euro area, and a series of defaults across nations and 
banks as the payments system fails.
europe muST decide: doeS iT wanT To 
STick wiTh The “moral hazard” regime 
or noT?
Europe  could  still  avoid  large–scale  defaults  by  resolutely 
supporting a bailout system for troubled banks and sovereigns 
in a renewed, highly credible manner. This was the initial plan of 
European politicians, as events unfolded in Greece in 2010, but 
it has failed as the electorate in donor nations becomes appalled 
by the reported waste and corruption in the troubled nations—
while those suffering the austerity programs are also balking.  It 
is now only the ECB that fights vigorously for this program. 
J O H N S O N ’ S   P B   -     L I N K S
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Figure 3     Claims of euro area members from netting of Euro System cross-border payments (in billions of euros)
Source:  Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, 5.
Note: The Bundesbank has commented on Sinn’s analysis, arguing that these correspondent accounts are effectively guaranteed by the ECB and so the full cost of any defaults 
would not be suffered by Germany alone.  However, they do agree that these transfers are a direct result of the financial crisis and capital flight out of the periphery.  In the March 
2011 Bundesbank “Monthly Report” they note, on page 35: “The sharp rise in the Bundesbank’s TARGET2 balance since 2007 is essentially due to the tension on the money 



















400N u m b e r   Pb11 - 1 3   J u l y   2 0 1 1
8
It is important to consider the transition of German official 
discussion regarding bailouts. After the initial Greek bailouts 
in Spring 2010 and pledges that there would be no European 
defaults,  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel  of  Germany  launched 
a  project  to  create  a  European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM) 
that would include potential defaults after mid–2013. At the 
time, Merkel stressed that defaults would only apply to bonds 
“issued after late 2013.”6 However, slow–adjusting deficits in 
the periphery mean more money is needed now and bailout 
fatigue has become evident in Germany; as a result, German 
views have shifted.
The most recent collapse in European bond values was trig-
gered by Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, after 
he suggested a Greek restructuring may be needed in an April 
14, 2011 interview to Die Welt newspaper.7 He later denied 
that he sought restructuring, but on June 6, 2011 he wrote a 
letter to Eurogroup finance ministers and ECB president Jean-
Claude Trichet calling for all Greek bonds to be restructured 
by extending their maturity by seven years. His language was 
unambiguous:
“This means that any agreement on 20 June has to 
include  a  clear  mandate—given  to  Greece  possibly 
together  with  the  IMF—to  initiate  the  process  of 
involving holders of Greek bonds. This process has 
to lead to a quantified and substantial contribution 
of bondholders to the support effort, beyond a pure 
Vienna initiative approach. Such a result can best be 
reached through a bond swap leading to a prolonga-
tion  of  the  outstanding  Greek  sovereign  bonds  by 
seven years, at the same time giving Greece the neces-
sary time to fully implement the necessary reforms 
and regain market confidence.”8
Bond markets have gyrated with each subsequent change 
in stance and the tensions in credit markets have even impacted 
credit default swap spreads on US major banks. The fact that 
the crisis, as measured by default swaps spreads and bond prices, 
is widening and worsening each time the Germans appear more 
reluctant to stick to the bailout regime is good evidence that 
investors recognize the “end of the moral hazard regime” may 
be something dire. 
A second issue, and one that should make Europe’s leaders 




8. Translated text as reported by Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/06/08/greece-germany-letter-idUSB4E7G900O20110608 
“bailout solution” appear to be leading to more hatred rather 
than a desire for consolidation and continuity. It is very typical 
in crises for populations in creditor nations to ridicule the trou-
bled places, while the troubled groups eventually blame credi-
tors for austerity rather than acknowledging and solving their 
own weaknesses. Such dynamics are divisive and can eventually 
lead to dangerous politics.
These dynamics are fully evident today in Europe. Despite 
Greece having made large pension reforms and budget cuts, it 
gets little credit in popular opinion among northern creditors. 
While the country managed to meet most IMF targets until 
June 30, media coverage often suggests the Greeks are off–track. 
Common wisdom is that Greeks do not pay taxes, yet budget 
revenues as a percentage of GDP in Greece are greater than in 
the United States, Japan, and Spain. Similar “half-truth” criti-
cisms are spreading about the Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, and 
Italians. 
The creditors do not have perfect track records, whatever 
they may claim or want to believe. As Trichet regularly points 
out, Germany sought to relax the Stability and Growth Pact in 
2005, sending a message that it was acceptable to break rules, 
simply because Germany did not want to implement its own 
austerity at that time. The Greeks complain that German banks 
should never have lent money to the corrupt Greek govern-
ment, while the Irish blame the ECB for requiring them to 
repay debts to creditors that, had they thought clearly about the 
risks, never should have lent money to Ireland’s reckless banks. 
Both of these complaints have some merit.  
If European leaders really want to avoid large defaults and 
so get the “bailout” regime back on track, they need to take 
decisive measures.
Creditor nations will need to publicly admit that bailout 
costs  may  run  far  higher  than  the  €750  billion  currently 
committed: €440 billion in the EFSF, €60 billion from the 
European Union and €250 billion from the IMF.9 Troubled 
banks across the euro area need larger capital injections, and 
euro area members need to be prepared to provide financing 
to troubled debtor countries for five to 10 years, rather than 
the one to two years currently implied in the current EU/IMF 
programs. 
To make such a program credible, both troubled nations 
and creditors will need to reduce the costs of required bailouts 
in order to make them feasible and acceptable for creditor elec-
torates. Despite the hard measures taken to date, Greece will 
run a budget deficit of €17 billion in 2011, according to IMF 
projections, which is 7.6 percent of GDP. Ireland launched the 
periphery’s first aggressive austerity program in 2009, yet in 
9. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/business/global/21euro.html N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 3   Ju l y   2 0 1 1
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2011 it is projected to run a €14.8 billion deficit, equal to 11 
percent of GNP. In both these countries, sharp cuts to invest-
ment budgets have been offset by rising costs of unemployment 
and other social benefits.  
These gradual deficit reductions leave the euro area bailout 
programs with unpredictable and large liabilities in the future. 
The only credible solution is to cut these liabilities more sharply 
and in a permanent manner. In Greece and Ireland, where the 
public sector grew rapidly in the last decade, very large public 
sector wage and benefit cuts are necessary. For example, the Irish 
budget could be near balance if the government abandons its 
pledge to maintain public sector wages and instead rolled back 
public sector costs to the levels of the mid–2000s. The aim must 
be to bring primary balances to a substantial surplus in 2012. 
The  creditor  nations,  to  make  this  credible,  must  also 
accept to socialize adjustment costs.  EU president Jose Manuel 
Barroso has led an important initiative for Greece that frees €15 
billion in investment and infrastructure finance over three years. 
Similar programs need to be expanded and accelerated for other 
periphery nations.
There is no doubt that the euro area cannot afford to bail 
out Italy. Yet Italy’s current “austerity program” is not nearly 
decisive enough to convince capital markets. The bulk of budget 
measures in this program are only implemented after elections 
in 2013 and 2014. Italy needs to move those measures forward 
and, as Greece and Ireland have done, focus on wage and benefit 
cuts  that  do  not  directly  cause  higher  unemployment  and 
related expenditure increases. In all cases supply side reforms, 
such as reducing labor and product market protectionism, while 
simplifying tax systems, need to be implemented simultane-
ously. Other large nations, such as France, must follow similarly. 
If austerity programs continue to disappoint, the periphery 
will need larger and longer bailout programs. The potential 
liabilities of these are difficult to estimate, and investors will 
naturally question the credibility of all parties involved when 
they promise to “do whatever it takes.” In this case interest rates 
will stay high, capital flight will continue, and euro area nations 
will further grow apart, making any orderly solution less and 
less likely.
It is also highly questionable whether it would be wise 
for Europe to align itself around renewed long-term bailout 
programs. If Europe is truly willing to guarantee senior bank 
creditors and sovereign bond holders for many years or decades, 
it needs long–term consensus and ability to ensure that sover-
eigns and banks do not abuse the system. We doubt that the 
euro area can ever implement effective prudential regulation for 
17 sovereigns and 7,856 banks.  
For all these reasons, Angela Merkel’s stance that creditors 
must eventually bear costs through defaults makes complete 
sense. But getting from the current arrangements to Merkel’s 
proposed regime will surely be very messy. 
ending The moral hazard regime 
deciSively
If moral hazard is to end (or be substantially reduced) Europe 
needs to admit that many sovereigns and banks have too much 
debt, and the maturity structure of the debt is completely inap-
propriate. Members will also need to quickly reduce their needs 
for budget financing. 
We do not believe this can be done piecemeal in an orderly 
manner. Once the decision is made to embark on default, for 
example by forcing the private sector to realize substantial net 
present value losses on bonds in Greece, investors will naturally 
assume that similar methods will be used elsewhere. Neither 
banks nor sovereigns in other troubled nations will be spared. 
Therefore, it makes sense to embark on this decisively rather 
than singly.
The size and maturity structure of debt can be transformed 
quickly through a series of debt restructurings across sovereigns. 
It seems most likely that each of GIIPS would need to restruc-
ture its debts. Belgium would probably also have to join. These 
nations could manage rapid restructurings by introducing legis-
lation that made it easy to force bond holders to swap their 
bonds for longer maturities, and reduced principal or interest 
bonds as necessary. By extending maturities, the credibility that 
nations can repay their debts would be substantially enhanced.
Those changes will cause serious problems for domestic 
banks,  insurance  companies,  and  pension  funds.  The  ideal 
solution would be to recapitalize these through a public sector 
program if private finance cannot be found and then encourage 
mergers with healthier institutions in core nations. 
At the same time, each troubled nation will need to end 
its budget deficit quickly. The most direct route, as discussed 
above, is to embark on significant public sector wage and benefit 
cuts that bring the primary balances into substantial surpluses. 
These steps will be hugely unpopular, but the reality is unfor-
tunate and simple—to stay in the euro area each nation must 
quickly get its house in order. Were they to leave the euro area, 
the situation would undoubtedly be initially far more chaotic. 
Politicians  could  always  offer  these  distinct  choices  through 
referendums. It is highly likely that GIIPS and Belgium would 
choose to remain in the euro area.  
The potential losses to the financial sector in core countries 
would be large, and related concerns would cause some spillover 
to other markets around the world. Since European institutions 
bought the vast bulk of European sovereign and bank debts, the 
direct non-European exposures are small. We doubt the prob-N u m b e r   Pb11 - 1 3   J u l y   2 0 1 1
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lems in Europe would generate Lehman–style trouble for the 
United States and Japan.10 
While on paper all these steps are feasible, they would 
surely feel chaotic and disorderly when implemented—and 
there would be a backlash. There is no simple means to coor-
dinate such complex decisions and the politics could at times 
be explosive. 
For those nations that are not part of the restructuring 
plans, the ECB would need to establish a cordon sanitaire, 
providing large-scale liquidity support to keep sovereign bond 
yields from rising sharply and to provide emergency liquidity 
to banks. At the global level, the Group of 20 could pledge to 
support the euro and provide swap lines to European banks in 
order to be sure they can refinance dollar exposures.11 
Six months ago it seemed as though Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal needed to be hived off while the remainder could be 
included in a “safe zone” that would be fully backed by the 
ECB and euro area. Today, with the lack of political credibility 
of any such system, it is increasingly likely Italy and Spain 
will find themselves outside the safe zone. This is the usual 
pattern for large-scale crises. When the Asian crisis began, no 
one imagined that South Korea would later succumb; indeed 
South  Korea  provided  bailout  funds  to  Thailand.  Nor  was 
it suspected that the dynamics would lead to the dramatic 
default and collapse in Russia. If crisis in Europe causes asset 
markets to fall and risk premiums to rise, we will get reces-
sions, rising budget deficits and spreading problems.
diSorderly end: The paTh we are 
currenTly on 
Policymakers are currently caught in an unsustainable limbo 
between promising selected defaults while imagining that they 
can hold together the rest of the euro area. It is clear to us 
that as these defaults are realized, and markets start to price 
in the end of the moral hazard regime across Europe, rising 
risk premiums will cause the problem to spread far deeper and 
wider than is currently envisioned.
The natural outcome will be a series of panics, large–
scale capital flight from one nation after another and then 
defaults. Greece is leading the way, but it could even spread 
10. US money market funds hold $435 billion in short–term euro area bank 
debt paper as of May 2011. This is substantial, but $412 billion of this is 
in paper issued by relatively safe French, German and Dutch banks. Any 
withdrawal of this funding from European banks as notes matured could easily 
be replaced by ECB repo lending.
11. This solution is an expanded variant of the cordon sanitaire we described 
previously. See Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, “Europe’s Monetary 
Cordon Sanitaire,” November 14, 2010, http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/johnson14/English. 
well beyond GIIPS. The economic destruction caused by these 
disorderly outcomes, in combination with what are likely to 
be divisive politics, may make it ever harder for any consensus 
to be reached across the euro area. This will, in turn, make the 
situation look more dangerous.
As  the  problem  in  Europe  grows,  the  more  troubled 
nations may gain the upper hand in ECB decision–making. 
Indeed, during this recent mini–crisis, nine members of the 
euro area saw bond prices fall while markets treated six as safe 
havens and their bonds rallied (two nations have no quoted 
bonds). This means the “troubled nations” are already in the 
majority.12 Starting in October 2011, five of six members of 
the ECB executive board, including the Bank president, will 
be from troubled nations.13 With such numbers, and a gover-
nance structure in which each nation has one vote, it is hard 
to understand why the ECB would retain its hawkish stance 
amid the crisis.    
To prevent financial collapse, the ECB may well choose 
to embark on large–scale bond–buying programs that cover 
many nations within the euro area while continuing to provide 
unlimited liquidity through the payments system. In effect, 
the central bank would demonstrate that it is prepared to be 
a fiscal bailout mechanism to Europe’s troubled nations. This 
will prevent or limit defaults, but it will lead to a sharp decline 
in the value of the euro and higher inflation. 
The evolution of politics in this scenario is hard to predict. 
It is imaginable that northern nations in Europe, faced with 
chaotic  markets,  large  bailout  costs  and  battles  within  the 
ECB, could chose to leave the euro area themselves and start a 
new currency. It is also possible the nations will band together 
and attempt to kick out some; this can be achieved by cutting 
off  the  correspondent  accounts  to  that  nation  at  national 
central banks. Ultimately, whatever occurs, the euro would 
turn into something more reminiscent of the Italian lira or 
the Spanish peseta than the strong deutsche mark its founders 
once envisioned. 
12. According to Bloomberg, during the week ended July 11, 2001, the price 
of 10–year bonds rose (yields, which move inversely to the price, fell) in 
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The 
price of bonds fell and yields rose in Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Estonia and Malta have no quoted 
10–year bonds.
13. While we do not want to question the inflation-fighting credentials of the 
individuals involved, the national composition of the ECB executive board 
after Jean-Claude Trichet leaves in October will be Italy (2 members), Portugal 
(1), Spain (1), Belgium (1) and Germany (1).  One Italian member, Lorenzo 
Bini–Smaghi, has reportedly agreed with President Nicolas Sarkozy of France 
to retire from the executive board by December 31, 2011, so that he can be 
replaced by a French national.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 3   Ju l y   2 0 1 1
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